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No. 20070855

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

SUSAN OLSEN,
Plaintiff/Appellant,
vs.
THE UNIVERSITY OF PHOENIX, INC.,
Defendant/Appellee,

BRIEF OF THE APPELLANT

Plaintiff/Appellant Susan Olsen submits this brief in support of her appeal
from an order granting the Motion for Summary Judgment in favor of
Defendant/Appellee.
JURISDICTION

This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal under Utah Code Ann.
§78A-4-103(j), conferring jurisdiction on this Court over cases transferred to this
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Court from the Supreme Court, which had original appellate jurisdiction under Utah
Code Ann. §78 A-3-102(j) over orders of any court of record over which the Court of
Appeals does not have original appellate jurisdiction. Pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§78A-4-103(j) and Utah rules of Appellate Procedure rule 42(a), this case was
transferred and assigned to the Court of Appeals.
ISSUE PRESENTED
Whether the Utah Court of Appeal should reverse the District Court's Order of
May 12, 2009, granting Defendant's Motion For Summary Judgment, given that
there were genuine issues of material fact 1: whether Defendant/Appellee's offer of
a course for an agreed upon tuition fee and directed study fee was a binding
contractual agreement preventing Defendant/Appellee from later requiring payment
of an undisclosed additional flat fee for unspecified electronic resource materials; 2:
whether the imposition of the undisclosed flat fee for unspecified electronic
resource materials was an unfair and deceptive act or practice; 3: whether that the
imposition of a late fee resulting from Defendant/Appellee's decision to reallocate
payment from one course to another was an unfair and deceptive act or practice; 4whether that practice of re-allocating payments from one balance to a disputed
balance was an unfair and deceptive act or practice; 5- whether Defendant/
Appellee's failure to properly investigate and correct reports it made to Equifax and
Experian were a violation of the Fair Credit Reporting Act; 5- whether the actions
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taken in collecting claimed amounts owed constituted tortuous conduct for which
relief may be granted.
A. Standard of review
The trial court's interpretation of a contract presents a question of law, which
the Appellate Court reviews for correctness. Green River Canal Company v. Thayn,
84 P.3d 1134,1140 (Utah 2003). The question of whether a contract is ambiguous is
decided by the court as a matter of law. Uintah Basin Medical Center v. Hardy, 110
P.3d 168, 172 (Utah App. 2005).
Summary Judgment is appropriate only if there has been a showing "that there is
no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law." J.R Simplot Company v. Sales King International Inc.
17 P.3d 1100, 1103 (Utah 2000). Therefore, when the Appellate Court reviews the
district court's decision to grant summary judgment, the Appellate Court reviews the
district court's legal decisions for correctness, giving no deference, and reviews the
facts and inferences to be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the
non-moving party." Id.
B. Preservation of issue
Plaintiff/Appellant timely filed a Notice of Appeal following the District
Court's granting of the Motion for Summary Judgment.
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DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL
PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
A. Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 56.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Nature of the Case
This case is a consumer rights case arising out of Plaintiff/Appellant's
transactions for educational services with Defendant/Appellee, a private educational
corporation. The Complaint contains causes of action for breach of contract,
violation of the Utah Consumer Sales Practices Act, violation of the federal Fair
Credit Reporting Act, and various tort claims. (District Court File, pgs. 1-16)
B. Course of the Proceedings and Disposition Below
On March 31, 2006, Plaintiff/Appellant

filed

her Complaint against

Defendant/Appellee University of Phoenix, Inc. for damages that she claimed were
caused by violations of the Utah Consumer Sales Practices Act, Utah Code Ann.
§13-11-1 et.seq., for violations ofthe Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15U.S.C.A. §1681,
et. seq., for breach of contract, fraud and misrepresentation, and intentional and
negligent infliction of emotional distress. (District Court File, pgs. 1-16)
On May 8,2006, Defendant/Appellee filed its Answer and jury demand. (District
Court File, pgs. 17-25)
On April 30, 2008, Defendant/Appellee filed: a Motion to Dismiss or for
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Summary Judgment; Memorandum in support of Motion to Dismiss or for Summary
Judgment; Affidavit of Briccannie Iverson in support of Motion to Dismiss or for
Summary Judgment; and Affidavit of David O. Williams in support of Motion to
Dismiss or for Summary Judgment (hereinafter referred to individually or as Motion
for Summary Judgment). (District Court File, pgs. 6-179)
On June 26, 2008, Defendant/Appellant filed her Opposition to Motion for
Summary Judgment; Affidavit of Susan Olsen in Support of Opposition to Motion
for Summary Judgment; Declaration of Chad Steur in Support of Opposition to
Motion for Summary Judgment. (District Court File, pgs. 180-319)
On September 19, 2008, Defendant/Appellee filed its Reply Memorandum in
Support of Motion to Dismiss or for Summary Judgment and Supplemental
Affidavit of Bricannie Iverson in Support of Motion to Dismiss or for Summary
Judgment. (District Court File, pgs. 323-417)
On November 5, 2008, the hearing on the Motion for Summary Judgment took
place in the Third Judicial District Court-West Jordan. The trial court granted
Defendant/Appellee's motion in its entirety and order Plaintiff/Appellant to submit a
Findings of Fact and Order. (District Court File, pgs. 422-429)
On May 12, 2009, the trial court signed and entered its Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law & Order. (District Court File, pgs. 430-432).
On June 11, 2009, Plaintiff/Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal. (District Court File,
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pgs. 433-434).
SUMMARY OF THE RELEVANT FACTS
Plaintiff/Appellant established the following relevant background facts:
Plaintiff was a student at the University of Phoenix in 2004, taking classes for an
elementary teaching certificate. (District Court File, pgs 91-179, see Exhibit A
Olsen Dep. at pg. 10 ). On February 3, 2004, Plaintiff signed Defendant's Student
Financial Agreement authorizing her course tuition to be automatically billed to
Plaintiff/Appellant's credit card. (District Court File, pgs 184-245, see Exhibit
A-University of Phoenix Online Student Financial Agreement.) On May 25, 2004,
Defendant registered Plaintiff for two online courses, SPE 532 and MED 509.
Defendant acknowledged it would process payment via her credit card. (District
Court File, pgs 184-245, see Exhibit A-May 25, 2004 and May 27, 2004 emails.)
On May 27, 2004, Defendant acknowledged Plaintiffs successful registration for
the course. (District Court File, pgs 184-245, see Exhibit A-May 25, 2004
orientation information email.)
Concerning the breach of contract claim and the various tort claims, Plaintiff
established the following facts: On May 20, 2004, Plaintiff asked her academic
advisor, via email, the costs of two courses she was considering, MAT/534 and
MAT/536. On May 24, 2004, via email, her academic advisor quoted the price for
MAT/534 of $294/credit hour plus a $250 directed study fee. On May 25, 2004,
-13-

Plaintiff, via email, agreed to take MAT/534. (District Court File, pgs 184-245, see
Exhibit C emails.) On June 30, 2004, Plaintiff received confirmation of successful
registration for MAT/534 (later changed to MAT/536). The only fee noted was the
$250 directed study fee. The method of payment was again acknowledged as being
the same as for tuition, e.g. the Student Financial Agreement. (District Court File,
pgs 184-245, see Exhibit A-June 30, 2004 directed study confirmation email.)
On August 9, 2004, Defendant sent an invoice to Plaintiff reflecting a $750
balance (the price of tuition and directed study free for MAT 536.) This invoice did
not reflect a charge for any other fee. (District Court File, pgs 184-245, see Exhibit
G-August 9, 2004 invoice.)
Plaintiff further established that Plaintiff, via email, alerted Defendant that the
invoice was incorrect due to the agreement she had with the academic counselor.
(District Court File, pgs 184-245, see Exhibit F-August 13, 2004 and August 16,
2004 one-page email exchange.)
On August 31,2004, Defendant admitted the error and agreed to the price quoted.
However, Defendant advised that it was assessing a previously undisclosed
electronic material fee (e-resource fee). Defendant apologized for failing to disclose
said fee. Defendant also told Plaintiff she had a past-due balance for SPE 532 and
MED 509. (District Court File, pgs 184-245, see Exhibit D-August 31, 2004 email.)
Concerning the Utah Consumer Sales Practices Act claim and the various tort
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claims, and specifically regarding the electronic material fee, Plaintiff established
that Defendant did not disclose this fee prior to her acceptance of the course offering
and that Defendant concealed the existence of this fee by not revealing the fee in any
materials pertaining to this course or the cancelled course. (District Court File, pgs
184-254, see Olsen Affidavit paragraphs 3 and 4.) Defendant's only reference to
the existence of this type of fee is contained in a catalogue page that states the fee is
due prior to the first session of class if it is applicable. (District Court File, pgs
180-183.) No documentation published or provided by Defendant states that the fee
is applicable to either MAT/534 or MAT/536. Defendant's own academic advisors
could be unaware of the existence of this fee (District Court File, pgs 255-316, see
Opposition page 5, Dispute as to Fact Number 10, and referenced exhibits.)
Defendant demanded payment of the e-resource fee at least eight [8] times and
made numerous threats to send her account to collections. (District Court File, pgs
184-245, see Exhibits F, G and H.)
Plaintiff established that her account was sent to campus collections andon
September 17, 2004, she was administratively withdrawn from classes. (District
Court File, pgs 184-245, see Exhibits L.)
When Defendant finally offered to waive its unfair fees, it was conditional and
only after the account had already been sent to collections. Plaintiff established that
via letter dated October 19,2004, Defendant offered to waive the electronic material
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fee and late fee if Plaintiff would pay the claimed past-due balance (District Court
File, pgs 184-245, see Exhibits E.) Plaintiff received a letter, with the same October
19, 2004 date, from an independent debt collection agency. (District Court File, pgs
184-245, see Exhibits I, Johnson & Roundtree letter.)
Concerning the Utah Consumer Sales Practices Act claim and various tort claims,
and specifically regarding the late fee and claimed past-due balance, Plaintiff
established that she had filled out and submitted prior to registering for those courses
an authorization to charge her credit card; that Defendant's policy prohibited the
completion of course registration unless full payment was received; and that
Plaintiff/Appellant received notice of successful registration for SPE 532 and MED
509.
Defendant's accounting records show payments were received on June 2, 2004
and June 10, 2004, and credited to SPE 532 and MED 509 (District Court File, pgs
184-245, see Exhibits B, Customer Account History.) Payment for SPE 532 and
MED 509 was credited as received almost one month before Plaintiff received, on
June 30, 2004, confirmation that she had successfully registered for MAT/534
(changed to MAT/536).
Plaintiff was sent the first invoice for MAT/536 on August 9, 2004. Defendant's
policy provided for the imposition of a late fee "when tuition is not paid prior to the
first class session of the course. " (District Court File, pgs 180-183). Defendant's
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Finance Director could not determine, looking at Defendant's student statements,
the basis for the late payment, and that the imposition of a late fee depended on how
Defendant applied funds to existing balances (District Court File, pgs 255-319, see
Deposition of Bricannie Iverson, pages 67-68.)
Concerning the federal Fair Credit Reporting Act and the tort claims, Plaintiff
established Defendant referred her account to Johnson & Roundtree collection
agency and to ACT collection agency; that Plaintiff disputed the debt with both
agencies; that Defendant reported the account as delinquent to Equifax and Experian;
that Plaintiff disputed the debt with Equifax and Experian; that Defendant verified
the debt with Equifax and Experian; and that Plaintiff was denied a loan from
Capital One based upon the Equifax report of the delinquent account. (District Court
File, pgs 184-254, see Exhibit I.)
Concerning damages on all claims, Plaintiff established that she suffered lost
time in dealing with the dispute, including lost time from work; that she suffered
mental and emotional stress including lost sleep, worry, depression, back pain, and a
20 pound weight gain. (District Court File, pgs 184-254, see Olsen Affidavit
paragraph 9.)
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

The Defendant's email offering MAT/534 for a specified tuition fee and
specified directed study fee was a valid offer and that Plaintiffs acceptance of that
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offer is a binding contractual agreement that Defendant breached by attempting to
add an additional fee to the amount owed and then administratively withdrawing
Plaintiff from the class for her refusal to pay.
The imposition of electronic material fee, undisclosed as related to the specific
course offerings and only mentioned in the general catalog price list as being
charged "when applicable" is a hidden fee and constitutes an unfair and deceptive
act or practice.
The imposition of a late fee, shown in Customer Account History as being
imposed on September 4, 2004 but not appearing in the September 9, 2004 invoice
or any other communication until October 13, 2004, after Defendant re-allocated
payment from SPE 532 and MED 509 to MAT/534, is a manipulation of
Defendant's late-fee policy and constitutes an unfair and deceptive act or practice.
The practice of re-allocating payments from one balance to a disputed balance is
an unfair and deceptive act or practice.
The reporting of Plaintiff s account as delinquent to Equifax and Experian based
on unfair and deceptive practices, and the failure to properly investigate and correct
reports following Plaintiffs disputes to those credit reporting agencies, is a violation
of the Fair Credit Reporting Act.
The actions taken as described above, and the repeated demand for payment, the
threats and actual referral to debt collection agencies, the reporting of Plaintiff s
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account as delinquent and unilaterally withdrawing Plaintiff from classes,
constitutes tortuous conduct for which relief should be granted.
Argument
1. The Utah Court of Appeal should reverse the District Court's Order dated
May 12, 2009, granting Summary Judgment as to the Breach of Contract claim.
The District Court's Order dated May 12, 2009, granting Summary Judgment,
found that the parties did not agree as to the payment of the electronic material fee
(E-resource fee) and thus it was properly charged. The basis for this determination
was Defendant's argument that no contract existed excluding the term because there
was no "meeting of the minds."
Under Utah law, contract analysis begins by looking at the four corners of the
contract for ambiguities. See Gillmor v. Macey,121 P.3d 57, 70 (Utah App. 2005).
The contract consists of the email offer and acceptance. On May 24,2004, via email,
Plaintiffs academic advisor offered MAT/534 for $294/credit hour plus a $250
directed study fee. On May 25, 2004, Plaintiff, via email, accepted the offer by
agreeing to take MAT/534. On June 30, 2004, Plaintiff received confirmation of
successful registration. There was no mention of an e-resource fee in any of these
communications.(District Court File, pgs 184-254, see Exhibits D and A.)
A reading of the four corners of the contract show it was unambiguous. It refers
with specificity to the significant, material terms of course designation, tuition rate
per credit hour, and a directed study fee. It also provides the terms of payment by
-19-

reference. There is no other indication that additional fees or charges may apply.
Although the contract on its face is unambiguous, under Utah law, the court
may still consider any relevant evidence to determine whether a latent ambiguity
exists. To that end, the court may "consider any credible evidence offered to show
the parties' intention/' Gillmorv. MaceyJ21 P.3d 57, 70 (Utah App. 2005).
The intent of the parties was to enter into a contract for educational services,
which is implied by the nature of the transaction.
To find a latent ambiguity, the court looked to the parties' relationship and the
general expectations given that relationship. In support, the Defendant set forth, and
the court found, that college courses generally require books or other materials.
Therefore, the court determined that Defendant's intent was that books and materials
would be covered elsewhere, which was different that Plaintiffs intent. The result
was an ambiguity and no meeting of the minds as to this term. The court concluded
that Defendant thus had a right to collect the fee.
The court erred in finding an ambiguity based on general relationship
expectations. First, it is clear that Defendant took no direct action that would give
Plaintiff the expectation that MAT/534 (or MAT/536) would require books and
materials. MAT/534 started on July 11, 2004. It is undisputed that Plaintiffs first
actual notice of the e-resource fee was August 31, 2004. Defendant could produce
no document that showed Plaintiff either knew or had access to information linking
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the fee to the course before that time. (District Court File, pgs 184-254, Olsen
Affidavit paragraph 3.)
Further, Plaintiff was not provided constructive notice. Although Defendant's
Tuition and Fees rate sheet reference the fee with the caveat "if applicable", the rate
sheet does not state when the fee applies or how the fee is different from the Book
and Material Charges also listed on the rate sheet. There is no guidance or criteria
for when the fee applies.
Utah law provides that vague or conditional terms are nebulous and
unenforceable. See Prince, Yeates & Geldzahler v. Young, 2004 UT 26, paragraph
18, (2004).

The notice in the rate sheet is both vague and conditional. It is the

equivalent of no notice.
Since Defendant took no action to put students on actual or constructive
notice that the cost of MAT/534 was $60 greater than advertised, Defendant argued
that Plaintiff should have expected the fee would be covered elsewhere because
books and materials were handled in that manner.
The important distinction is that books and materials are never a set fee.
Defendant's Tuition and Fees schedule acknowledges this in stating that "Book and
Material Charges" vary by course. The e-resource fee, if applicable, is always $60.
Plus, the e-resource fee is not the Book and Material Charges. It is a separate fee in
addition to Book and Material Charges.
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Thus, the Court incorrectly found an ambiguity based on the analogy to a book
and material charge. It may well be that book and material charges would be handled
outside of the contract. However, there was no evidence that the parties intended for
this special fee to be excluded from the quote for the course.
However, if the Court of Appeal finds that an ambiguity did exist, then the
Court of Appeal review is "strictly limited" to determine if the trial court's findings
of

fact

are "sufficiently

supported

by the evidence

and not

clearly

erroneous..."(internal citations omitted). Id.
The trial court's findings of fact are clearly erroneous. The evidence that
Plaintiff should have anticipated an e-resource fee separate from the tuition and
directed study fee was twofold: Plaintiffs deposition testimony and the Affidavit of
Defendant's Director of Finance.
Plaintiff testified that she didn't recall whether or not all of her courses
required a textbook, or the costs of those textbooks.
The Director of Finance provided an Affidavit that set forth the general
proposition that most courses require textbooks or other required reading material. It
goes on to state that, "[occasionally, the text or required reading will be made
available online, for which the University charges an electronic resources fee, or
"e-resource" fee, of $60.00, in lieu of the student having to purchase a separate
hard-copy textbook."
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This evidence supports the general proposition that books and materials are
required for most courses. It may even support the general proposition that books
and materials transactions are intended to be covered separately from tuition and fee
transactions. However, the finding of fact linking the e-resource fee to transactions
involving books and materials is clearly erroneous.
There are clear distinctions between required textbooks or reading materials
and the e-resource fee. Textbooks or reading materials are generally required. The
e-resource fee was only "occasionally" required, and only required for attendees of
the Utah campus.
Textbooks or reading materials do not equate to a set cost. The price varies by
textbook type and author. The cost to the student varies depending on the choice to
purchase new or used textbooks. The e-resource fee, on the other hand, was a flait fee,
regardless type, author, or date of authorship.
Textbooks or reading materials costs may be avoided. Students may choose not
to purchase a textbook but instead use the textbook at the library, or borrow one from
a friend. The e-resource fee was a required fee.
Textbooks or reading materials transactions did not require purchases from
Defendant. There are numerous book sellers a student may choose from. The
e-resource fee transaction required payment to Defendant.
The Findings of Fact were clearly erroneous based on the evidence. It should
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also be noted that no adequate foundation that the Director of Finance had personal
knowledge concerning e-resource fee. In the Affidavit, she states that each student
has an online account which contains a link to a webpage showing and explaining
the e-resource fee. In deposition, when this subject came up, she admitted she didn't
know if this statement applied to Plaintiff. Her pre-deposition review of this case did
not give her any reason to believe that Plaintiff would have known of the existence
of the e-resource charge prior to August 31, 2004.
2. The Utah Court of Appeal should reverse the District Court's Order dated May
12, 2009, granting Summary Judgment as to the claim for violations of the Utah
Consumer Sales Practices Act, Utah Code Ann. §13-11-1 et. seq.
The Utah Consumer Sales Practices Act (UCSPA) prohibits deceptive acts or
practices by suppliers in a consumer transaction. The Act defines "Supplier" as a
seller or other person who regularly solicits consumer transactions. See Utah Code
Ann. §13-11-3(6). A "Consumer transaction" includes the sale of goods, services,
or other property, both tangible and intangible, to a person for primarily personal,
family, or household purposes

" See Utah Code Ann. § 13-11-3(2).

The central purpose of the Sales Practices Act is "to protect consumers from
suppliers who commit deceptive and unconscionable sales practices.'1 Utah Code
Ann. § 13-11-2(2).
The UCSPA broadly defines a deceptive act or practice. Per se violations of the
act include the following: 1-Making a representation that a specific price advantage
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exits, if it does not. Utah Code Ann. § 13-11-2(2); 2- Indicating that a consumer
transaction involves or does not involve .. .obligations, if the representation is false.
Utah Code Ann. §13-1 l-4(j)(i); and 3-Charging a consumer for a consumer
transaction that has not previously been agreed to by the consumer; Utah Code Ann.
§13-ll-4(r).
A. The imposition of the e-resource fee is a deceptive act or practice.
As shown above, Plaintiff established that she did not receive actual or
constructive notice that enrolling in MAT/534 (later MAT/536) would obligate her
to pay Defendant a $60 e-Resource fee. Thus, the May 24, 2004, email offering
MAT/534 for $294/credit hour plus a $250 directed study fee is a written
representation concerning a price advantage which did not exist, which was false,
and which Plaintiff did not agree to pay. These are per se violations of the UCSPA.
The term "rEsource® Course Materials Charge" is a fa?ade. It is a term that is
used to disguise an additional administratively imposed fee that in this case is in
addition to the disclosed Directed Study fee.
The fact it is a fa?ade is established by the lack of relationship between the fee
and the actual material costs. The fee is always $60, while the Tuition and Fee rate
sheet establishes that Books and Material Charges vary.
Further, the fee is a charged by the Utah campus only. It is a campus-specific fee,
not a material specific fee. On August 31, 2004, Defendant's Financial Services
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Representative explained the fee to Plaintiff stating that, "E resource is something
that the Utah campus uses for class materials, and readings. Although you owe the
Online campus, you are coded under our campus, so we have to collect from you."
The evidence establishes that the e-Resource fee is a way for the Utah campus to
generate additional fixed revenue regardless of the nature and extent of e-resources
provided. For non-Utah campus students, the actual costs of the e-resourses are
absorbed in the tuition or other fees charged. Online students through the online
University are not charged this fee.
The UCSPA provides that the Director of the Division of Consumer
Protection shall promulgate substantive rules concerning the Act. These "shall be
liberally construed and applied to promote their purpose and policies. Rl 52-11-1.
The substantive rules promulgated pursuant to this authority provide for
additional definitions and per se violations. An advertisement is defined as any
written communication made to a consumer which identifies or represents the terms
of any item of service. R152-11-1B(1). An offer means any attempt to effect an offer
to enter into a consumer transaction. Rl 52-11 -1 B(6).
These rules state that it is a deceptive act to make any offer in written advertising
without stating clearly and conspicuously any conditions. R152-11-2A. The list of
per se violations include failing to disclose additional charges. R152-11-2A(1).
In addition to the other noted violations which also apply here, the imposition of
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an e-resource fee by the Utah campus only was not disclosed.
The UCSPA also prohibits unconscionable acts. Utah Code Ann. §13-11-5. An
unconscionable act or practice can be either procedural or substantive. "Procedural
unconscionability was recharacterized in Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co.,
121 U.S. App. D.C. 315, 350 F.2d 445, 449 (D.C. Cir. 1965), as "absence of
meaningful choice." The court elaborated: Unconscionability has generally been
recognized to include an absence of meaningful choice on the part of one of the
parties together with contract terms which are unreasonably favorable to the other
party. Whether a meaningful choice is present in a particular case can only be
determined by consideration of all the circumstances surrounding the transaction."
Resource Management Co. v. Weston Ranch & Livestock, Co., 106 P2d 1028.
Plaintiff clearly did not have a meaningful choice because the e-resource fee was
mandatory.
B. The imposition of the late fee is a deceptive act or practice.
On May 25,2004, Defendant registered Plaintiff for two online courses, SPE 532
and MED 509. Defendant acknowledged it would process payment via her credit
card. On May 27,2004, Defendant acknowledged Plaintiffs successful registration
for the course. Defendant's accounting records show payments were received and
credited to these two courses on June 2, 2004 and June 10, 2004.
Defendant's policy provided for the imposition of a late fee "when tuition is not
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paid prior to the first class session of the course."
Initially, Defendant claimed the tuition was due for MAT/534. The invoice dated
August 9, 2004 stated the amount due was for MAT/534. However, no late fee was
imposed.
At some point in time, Defendant re-allocated payment from SPE 532 and MED
509 to MAT/534. The August 31, 2004 email to Plaintiff is the first communication
to reflect the reallocation. Also, the reallocation is reflected in the invoice dated
September 9, 2004. However, neither the email nor the invoice shows a late fee.
Defendant's internal accounting record, titled Customer Account History, shows
that the late fee was imposed on September 4, 2004. Plaintiff was not notified until
the invoice dated October 13,2004. Since that invoice claims a balance owing from
SPE 532 and MED 509, the late fee must relate to that balance.
If the Customer Account History is accurate, the imposition of the late fee was
concealed from Plaintiff in the September 9, 2004 invoice. Regardless, the records
show that payment for SPE 532 and MED 509was not late due to any action or
inaction of the Plaintiff. A balance was due for SPE 532 and MED 509 only because
of the action of Defendant in reallocating payment.
The imposition of a late fee violates Defendant's policy because the tuition was
timely paid. The failure of Defendant to clearly and conspicuously represent that a
late fee could be imposed following a reallocation of payment is an unfair and
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deceptive act.
C. The reallocation of payment from one debt to a disputed debt is and unfair and
deceptive act or practice.
Defendant has admitted to reallocating the payment she made for MAT 536 to
SPE 532 and MED 509 after Plaintiff had disputed the charge for MAT 536. This is
an unconscionable act under the UCSPA because Plaintiff had no choice where the
debt would be applied and Plaintiff was never provided with notice that a
reallocation could result in the imposition of a late fee.
By way of analogy to other laws, both the terms "deceptive" and
"unconscionable" are found in the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA). The
FDCPA expressly makes it per se unconscionable to: (a) falsely represent the
character, amount, or legal status of the debt. If the debtor owes multiple debts, the
collector may not apply a payment to a disputed debt, and must follow the debtor's
instructions, if any, on allocation of payments to one particular debt instead of
another. See 15 USC § 1692h.
3. The Utah Court of Appeal should reverse the District Court's Order dated May
12, 2009, granting Summary Judgment as to the claim for violations of the Fair
Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C.A. §1681, et. seq.
The Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order dated May 12,2009 state
that the Court determined that Defendant did not pay for all her classes and did owe
$588 for tuition and a $30 late fee.
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The Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) establishes rules for furnishers of
information upon receipt of disputes. In general, after receiving notice of a dispute, a
provider of information must conduct an investigation with respect to the disputed
information, review all of the relevant information provided by the consumer
reporting agency, and report the results of the investigation to the agency. 15 U.S.C.
§ 1681s-2.
Plaintiff established that she wrote and telephone the University Collection
Center after they placed a charge off on her account and reported it to the credit
reporting agencies. Plaintiff verbally disputed the issue with University Collection
Center manager Brett Dallas who refused to review the file, including two written
letters disputing the debt. The failure to investigate and report is a violation of the
FCRA.
a. State law claims are not pre-empted.
The Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order dated May 12, 2009 did
not address the issue of pre-emption raised by Defendant in the Motion for Summary
Judgment. In brief, Plaintiffs state law claims were not pre-empted due to the lack
of an actual conflict between state laws and the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA).
In addition, the FCRA expressly preserves state law causes of action. "Except as
provided in subsections (b) and (c), this title does not annul, alter, affect, or exempt
any person subject to the provisions of this title from complying with the laws of any
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State with respect to the collection, distribution, or use of any information on
consumers, or for the prevention or mitigation of identity theft, except to the extent
that those laws are inconsistent with any provision of this title, and then only to the
extent of the inconsistency." 15 U.S.C. § 1681t.
b. Plaintiff did establish evidence of a "Consumer Reporting Agency."
The Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order dated May 12, 2009 did
not address the issue raised by Defendant in the Motion for Summary Judgment that
Plaintiff did not establishing that Defendant was a provider of consumer reporting
information. In brief, Plaintiff provided documentation, including the Equifax and
Experian reports, confirming that Defendant was a provider of information, was
contacted and confirmed the information reported.
4. The Utah Court of Appeal should reverse the District Court's Order dated May
12, 2009, granting Summary Judgment as to the claim for the state tort violations.
The

fraudulent

misrepresentation,

negligent

misrepresentation,

and

intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress claims are not specifically
identified in the May 12, 2009 Order granting Summary Judgment. The Court
simply determined that Defendant owed $588 for tuition, $30 for a late fee, and $60
for the e-resource fee, and thus did nothing wrong in trying to collect that amount.
If the Court of Appeal upholds this determination, it will also determine that
two of the initial communications to Plaintiff regarding the debt were
misrepresentations: the invoice dated August 9,2004 showing a balance due of $750,
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and the invoice dated August 27, 2004 showing no balance due for MAT/536.
If the Court of Appeal upholds this determination, it is a finding that Plaintiff
owed for MAT/536, the only course at issue with a tuition fee of $588. Thus,
upholding the determination also results in a determination that two invoices sent to
Plaintiff assessing charges for SPE/532 and MED/509, dated September 9,2004 and
October 13, 2004, are misrepresentations of amounts owed. Also, it means that the
August 31, 2004 email to Plaintiff is a misrepresentation that a balance is due for
SPE/532 and MED/509.
The late fee was imposed September 4, 2004. It is not reflected in the invoice
dated September 9, 2004. This is a misrepresentation of an amount owed by
omission.
The trial court's found the late fee appropriate because of unpaid tuition for
MAT/535. Since the late fee was imposed for a balance due on SPE/532 and
MED/509, the failure to properly attribute the source of this late fee in any
communication constitutes a misrepresentation. Thus, the trial court's determination
means the October 13, 2004 and November 8, 2004 invoices assessing the late fee
related to SPE/532 and MED/509 are misrepresentations.
All of the demands for payment that included a late fee and all of the reporting by
Defendant following the assessment of the late fee on September 4, 2004 are false
misrepresentations because the payment of the tuition for SPE/532 and MED/509
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was not owed. The tuition for each course was $498, or $996 combined, not $588 as
the court found was due.
Thus, the accounting used by Defendant to establish the crediting of the amounts
debited to her account, Exhibit 10 to her deposition, establish that false information
was communicated to debt collectors and to Experian and Equifax.
Even if the Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's Order, the numerous
misrepresentations that Order establishes were clearly misleading. After creating
unjustified confusion, Defendant sent Plaintiffs account to two different collection
agencies and unilaterally withdrew Plaintiff from the school. False negative
information was reported to Equifax and Experian resulting in the denial of a loan.
Defendant's conduct was outrageous and intolerable because it was all caused by its
misrepresentation that it would fully charge the amount owed for tuition on
Plaintiffs credit card.
Defendant's tortuous conduct caused Plaintiff to suffer severe emotional
distress. She spend numerous hours trying to figure out how she could possibly owe
money on courses she had been told would be charged in full to her credit card. She
spent numerous hours contesting the misrepresentations relating to the invoices. All
of this caused stress, back pain, weight gain, and sleep loss. It cause financial strain
and a loan denial.

-33-

CONCLUSION
For the above stated reasons, Plaintiff/Appellant respectfully requests that the
Utah Court of Appea reverse the District Court's Order dated May 12, 2009,
granting Summary Judgment.
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